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Recent literature has emphasized that redistributive grant systems may tend to internalize 
fiscal externalities arising from tax competition. This paper further explores the conditions 
under which local grant systems enforced by the state government will enhance efficiency. A 
system of redistributive grants among governments is introduced into a standard model of tax 
competition. This basic model is then extended in order to allow for variations in the 
government objectives at the state level. A subsequent empirical analysis of local tax policy 
exploits the experience with local fiscal revenue sharing in Germany. The results suggest that 
attempts of state level governments to extract fiscal resources from the local revenue sharing 
system exert an upward pressure on tax rates. 
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Many countries display a substantial degree of taxing autonomy for local jurisdictions not
only with regard to the taxation of land or property but also with regard to income taxation.
As emphasized in the tax competition literature this may lead to ine±ciently low taxes due
to the existence of ¯scal externalities of local tax policy decisions (e.g., Wilson, 1999).
However, many countries with a decentralized public sector also display some redistributive
grant systems which tend to internalize ¯scal externalities arising from tax competition
(Bucovetsky and Smart, 2002, KÄ othenbÄ urger, 2002).
While the existence of redistributive grant systems may explain why local governments in
those countries make use of distortive taxes despite of tax competition (Smart, 1998, Dahlby,
2002), the welfare implications from tax competition and tax coordination strongly depend
on the government objectives. In fact, as noted by Wildasin and Wilson (2004) the standard
view that tax competition reduces welfare is probably most challenged by Leviathan models,
where governments pursue objectives other than maximizing the utility of residents.
Given this background the current paper explores the conditions under which redistributive
grant systems will or will not achieve or raise e±ciency in local ¯nances. More speci¯cally,
we consider a standard model of tax competition between local jurisdictions and follow
Bucovetsky and Smart (2002) by introducing a system of redistributive grants enforced by
the state level which under certain assumptions restores e±ciency. This setting is then
extended by introducing additional government objectives at the state level, such that the
state government is not solely interested in the e±ciency of local ¯nances but also aims
at pursuing own policies under its speci¯c constraints. The extensions enable us to derive
some testable hypotheses and predictions under which conditions the potentially bene¯cial
state intervention into local ¯nances introduces new distortions at the local level. It turns
out that if the state government wants to raise expenditures related to own policies and
cannot further reduce unconditional grants to local jurisdictions, it may use its in°uence on
the local tax policy in order to raise local tax revenue, which, in turn, is transferred to the
state budget by means of higher local jurisdictions' revenue sharing contributions.
1The theoretical implications are ¯nally contrasted with the experience in Germany. Ger-
many is a particularly interesting case to study in this respect as it combines municipal tax
autonomy and substantial revenue sharing among municipalities supervised and enforced
by the states (LÄ ander). Previous research also indicates that the revenue sharing among
municipalities does in fact exert a strong impact on the jurisdictions' tax policy (Buettner,
2005). At the same time, some of the German states are in an increasingly di±cult ¯scal
situation where the debt burden is rather high such that they may be tempted to induce
local jurisdictions to increase taxing e®ort. Moreover, also the German system of ¯scal
federalism provides several incentives and disincentives for government policies at the state
level which can be used to identify the constraints under which the states operate. This will
allow us to investigate whether, in fact, the response of state governments to changes in the
policy constraints, say a reduction in the grants received at the level of states, includes an
adjustment of the revenue sharing system among municipalities.
Since it is very di±cult to compare the complex local revenue sharing systems across German
states, our analysis considers the empirical implications for the local tax policy and test
whether conditions faced by state policy makers are re°ected in the tax policy pursued at
the local level. The results indicate that, controlling for di®erences in the tax base, the local
tax rate does respond to some signi¯cant degree and in the way suggested by the theory to
the ¯scal conditions at the state level. This supports the concern that the potential bene¯ts
from local revenue sharing cannot be obtained if the state as the institution enforcing the
revenue sharing system pursues own objectives.
The paper proceeds as follows. The following section contains the theoretical analysis which
derives empirical implications with regard to local jurisdictions' tax policy. Section three,
then, provides an empirical analysis of tax policy in Germany. The last section provides the
conclusions.
22 Theoretical Analysis
This section formally explores the conditions under which a redistributive grant system en-
forced by the state can be expected to restore e±ciency in a situation of tax competition,
and, under which circumstances the grant system will introduce additional ine±ciencies.
A ¯rst subsection lays out a standard model of tax competition, before the second sub-
section de¯nes an optimal grant system designed to raise the e±ciency of the local public
sector, which is closely related to Bucovetsky and Smart (2002). A third subsection, then,
introduces the possibility of additional state government objectives beyond simply ensuring
e±cient local ¯nances. Finally, the fourth subsection analyzes the impact of redistributive
grant systems at the state level.
2.1 Tax Competition
We consider a set of n local jurisdictions, labelled i = 1;:::;n, which are situated in the
same state. In each of them, a competitive ¯rm produces the same homogenous private
good by means of two factors, one of which is mobile, say capital, the other immobile, say
labor. Denoting by ki the amount of capital employed in jurisdiction i per unit of labor,
the per capita production function f(ki) is assumed to be identical across jurisdictions with
f0 > 0 and f00 < 0. Local jurisdictions levy a source based tax on capital at a rate of ¿i units
per unit of capital installed in jurisdiction i. Pro¯t maximization by local ¯rms and free
mobility of capital imply that the net rate of return to capital r is equal across jurisdictions
and given by the after tax marginal product of capital:
r = f
0 (ki) ¡ ¿i:
As a consequence, capital demand (per-capita) at location i is determined by a function
ki = Á(r + ¿i):










Thus, both a higher net interest rate and a higher local tax rate reduce the demand for
capital in jurisdiction i.
Residents of jurisdiction i derive utility ui from private (ci) and public (zi) consumption per
capita in their home jurisdiction according to a quasi-linear utility function
ui = ci + ®iv (zi)
where v is an increasing and strictly concave function. The parameter ®i > 0 measures the
intensity of preferences for the public good in jurisdiction i and may vary across jurisdictions.
Private consumption per-capita is given by
ci = f (ki) ¡ kif
0 (ki) + sir
= f (ki) ¡ ki (r + ¿i) + sir;
where si is the capital endowment of residents in jurisdiction i per-capita. Public consump-
tion is determined by the budget constraint of the local government
zi = ¿iki + gi;
where gi is revenue from grants.
Suppose that the total net supply of capital to the state is a positive function s(r) of the



















Notice that from @ki=@¿i = @ki=@r < 0 and @s=@r > 0, it follows that ¡1 < @r=@¿i < 0.
We assume that the local jurisdictions choose their tax rates simultaneously such that each
jurisdiction takes the tax rates of the other jurisdictions as given and neglects the impact
of its tax policy on the other jurisdictions. Private consumption ci is a function of the local
capital stock ki and the net interest rate r which in turn are determined by the local tax
rates. In the absence of grants, the same is true for local public good supply zi. The utility
of the residents of jurisdiction i can thus be written as a function of the tax rate set by this





















! = 0: (1)
As a benchmark, let us now consider a situation where the state government directly chooses
the local tax rates ¿i and the levels of the local public good zi. Assume that the state











f (kj) ¡ kj (r + ¿j) + sjr + ®jv(zj)
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1 ! = 0; (2)
@L1
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A ! = 0: (3)
Equation (2) shows that in an e±cient allocation, the marginal rate of substitution be-
tween private and public consumption, ®i@v=@zi, must be equalized across jurisdictions.
Eliminating ¸1 with the help of (2), condition (3) becomes
@L1
@¿i


































! = 0: (4)
A comparison between equations (1) above and (4) shows that the last two terms in (4) are
not taken into account by the local governments. These terms capture the ¯scal externality
exerted by an increase in the tax rate in locality i on other jurisdictions. The last term,
which is positive, expresses the direct bene¯t from capital °owing into other jurisdictions,
while the second-to-last term is the indirect e®ect arising from a change in the equilibrium
interest rate.
In order to avoid unnecessary complexity in the exposition, in the sequel, we follow Bucov-
etsky and Smart (2002) and restrict attention to a model where the solution to (2) and (3)
displays a uniform tax rate ¿i = ¿j =: ¿. This implies that also capital demand is equalized
across jurisdictions, ki = kj =: k. Moreover, for simplicity, assume that in the ¯rst best
situation described by (2) and (3) the endowment with capital is equal to the demand of
capital in all jurisdictions, si = k. Then, at the ensuing equilibrium rate of return the net
supply of capital to the state is zero, s(r) = 0.
62.2 E±cient Revenue Sharing
Now, while the state government by assumption di®ers in its view on optimal ¯scal policies
it may want to raise e±ciency of local taxation. In most real constitutions, however, the
state government does not directly control taxes and spending in local jurisdictions as in
the benchmark described in (2) and (3). One possible option to nevertheless internalize
¯scal externalities consists of imposing corrective taxes or subsidies (Wildasin, 1989). This
could be done, for instance, by setting a marginal contribution rate #i such that income
from grants gi is a linear function of the tax base1
gi = yi ¡ #iki:
Facing this grant scheme, the utility of a local jurisdiction is a function of the tax rate and
the two parameters determining the grant:
u
2
i (¿i;#i;yi) = f (ki) ¡ ki (r + ¿i) + sir + ®iv (¿iki + yi ¡ #iki):






















! = 0: (5)
In a situation where the net capital supply is zero in all jurisdictions the second term
drops out. Rearranging yields the usual optimality condition stating that the marginal
rate of substitution between public and private consumption equals the marginal rate of














1This speci¯cation re°ects the common characteristic of most redistributive transfer systems that trans-
fers are inversely related to the tax base or some corresponding measure of \¯scal capacity".
7As the contribution rate #i enters the denominator on the right hand side we see that the





@r < 0 and 0 > @r






@¿i < 0. Hence
the marginal cost of public funds decreases if #i is raised. By imposing a higher #i, hence,
the state government can induce the local jurisdiction to increase the local tax rate, that is,
@¿i=@#i > 0.








In this subsection we consider a benevolent state government. It will distribute back the
full amount of resources collected from the individual jurisdictions by means of grants such





























2 ! = 0; (7)
which indicates that the state government di®erentiates the unconditional grants yi among
local jurisdictions such that the marginal rates of substitution are equalized. The optimal







































and replacing ¸2 by ®i
@v



























! = 0: (9)
In the Appendix it is shown that the condition (9) is equivalent to (4) from the previ-
ous subsection. This con¯rms that a linear grant scheme can indeed internalize the ¯scal
externalities induced by tax competition.
Using the symmetry of the ¯rst best solution, one can further compute the optimal contri-
























Here ¿ is the optimal local tax rate according to (4), @k
@r
r
k is the interest elasticity of capital




interest elasticity of capital supply to the state. We can immediately see the result of
Bucovetsky and Smart (2002) that only if capital supply were completely inelastic, @s
@r = 0,
the marginal contribution rate is set equal to the tax rate. Otherwise, a lower contribution
rate is optimal.
Notice that even in the symmetric situation, we allow for di®erences in preferences expressed
by di®erent ®i. In order to obtain an e±cient decentralized solution despite these, the
approach of Bucovetsky and Smart (2002) requires a complete set of individual lump-sum
grants yi to each jurisdiction. In a more general setting, where also the optimal tax rates
vary across jurisdictions, the contribution rates #i must also di®er so as to correct incentives
speci¯cally for each local jurisdiction.
92.3 The Role of Own State Government Objectives
The preceding analysis has dealt with the state government as a benevolent institution which
employs a grant policy where the sole objective is the e±ciency of local ¯nances. However,
it is not obvious, whether it is appropriate to consider states as benevolent agencies solving
ine±ciencies from local externalities. For instance, mobility, which may be an important
driving force towards e±ciency, is much lower at the state as compared to the local level.
This raises the question of whether the results are robust against the inclusion of separate
state-level objectives.
Let us consider the case where the state government aims not simply at maximizing residents'
utility. Instead, following Edwards and Keen (1996), let the state be interested in spending
some public funds e even if the residents do not derive any utility from those expenditures.







j (¿j;#j;yj) + ¯w(e);
where the ¯rst term is, as before, the sum of residents' utility, i.e., V 2 , and w(e) is some
increasing and strictly concave sub-utility function capturing the valuation of expenditures e
by the state government. If we take account of the state budget constraint we see a trade-o®
between state spending e and the amount of grants allocated to the jurisdictions







where m is some exogenously ¯xed source of revenue which is not a®ected by local policies.
For the subsequent analysis, the role of unconditional grants is crucial. On the one hand,
if the state government can adjust
P
j yj according to its desires we have a rather trivial
case where the state government's expenditure decision does not con°ict with the e±ciency
of local ¯nances. But, if the state drives down the volume of funds transferred to the local
jurisdictions it will approach some limit where political cost increase as the operation of local
10jurisdictions becomes di±cult.2 To account for such a limitation, let us assume for simplicity
that there is some lower bound to the unconditional grants, where the state cannot further
reduce the transfers to the local jurisdictions. At this limit, however, the state may use its
in°uence on the local tax policy in order to induce local jurisdictions to raise tax revenue.
The additional revenue will then, in turn, be partly transferred to the state budget by means
of higher ¯nancing contributions of local jurisdictions in the system of revenue sharing.
In order to discuss this in the current model, assume that the average unconditional grant







In order to distinguish the issue of horizontal redistribution among municipalities from the
role of the state's objectives, in the following, we keep the assumption of Bucovetsky and
Smart (2002) that the individual grants yi are still di®erentiated among local jurisdictions.
By replacing e with the net receipts of funds from the municipalities and other, exogenous,
sources of ¯scal revenue m we can rewrite the state government's optimization problem for
the case where the total amount of transfers to the municipalities is not allowed to fall short

































3 ! = 0: (12)
2This is the case in Germany where the state governments have to ensure, under constitutional law,
that their municipalities are able to accomplish their functions (e.g., Article 73 (1) of the state constitution
of Baden-WÄ urttemberg; corresponding rules can also be found for the other states). If the state would
substantially reduce the transfers to the municipalities, they would appeal to the state court of justice
(Staatsgerichtshof). Two of the last eight decisions of the Staatsgerichtshof in Baden-WÄ urttemberg, for
example, deal with the volume of grants received by the municipalities.
11This condition can take two shapes. Firstly, the constraint (11) on the minimal amount
of unconditional grants may not be binding. Then ¸3 = 0 and we have ®i
@v
@zi = ¯ @w
@e.
Thus, if the state can adjust the lump sum grants without restriction at the margin, she
will do so until her own marginal bene¯t of funds equals the marginal bene¯t of public
funds for a local juristdiction. Secondly, if the constraint on the unconditional grants binds,
¸3 = ¯ @w
@e ¡ ®i
@v
@zi > 0. In this case, the Lagrange variable measures the net bene¯t to
the state from transferring one unit of tax revenues from jurisdiction i to the state level,
determined by the di®erence between the marginal valuation of spending at the state level
and the marginal utility of public funds in jurisdiction i. Since we are interested in the
case where the state government provides only minimal support for local municipalities,
it is plausible to restrict attention to this case. Notice, however, that in both cases, the
marginal rates of substitution ®i
@v
@zi are equalized among the local jurisdictions by means of
unconditional grants yi.











































In order to assess the impact of the state's own objective on her choice of grant scheme,
we start by considering the contribution rate of the ¯rst best solution (9). We then use
(13) to evaluate in which direction the state would like to adjust this rate as soon as she
takes the new, sel¯sh objective into account.3 To do so, we compare equation (13) with the

































3Since in this paper, our aim is to highlight the incentives introduced by own state objectives, we restrict
attention to a local analysis of the ¯rst order conditions around the ¯rst best, or to comparative statics
around a local optimum. A global analysis would be much more involved while being very unlikely to
produce additional economic insights.
12The sign of this expression depends ¯rst of all on the term ¯ @w
@e ¡ ®i
@v
@zi: In the case of
a binding constraint (11), this is positive, i.e. the state at least wants to extract further
resources from the local jurisdictions.
Whether or not the state government is able to extract resources from the local revenue
sharing system by inducing higher local taxes depends, however, also on the sign of the
second term. This term expresses by how much the aggregate receipts from revenue sharing
P
j #jkj collected by the state changes if the contribution rate for state i is increased. If this
term is positive, the state will indeed raise more revenue by increasing #i. This expression
may be negative, however. A decrease in the contribution rate might raise revenue because
it might cause, via the associated fall in the tax rate ¿i and the corresponding rise in the
net interest rate r, a strong in°ow of capital to the state as a whole. This might then
outweigh the direct e®ect of taking less money away from jurisdiction i. To see under which
circumstances the positive e®ect prevails, notice that from the capital market equilibrium



























In this expression, the term in squared brackets is positive if @s=@r is small. Intuitively,
in the extreme case where the state is (almost) a closed economy, the total amount of
capital is (almost) ¯xed, and thus total revenue can only rise if a contribution rate is
increased. Therefore, if the capital supply is not too elastic the state government gains from
an increased #i and induces a higher local tax rate than in the benchmark case (9).
We can summarize these ¯ndings by the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (Distortion by State Government Objectives)
If the state government values own funds more than the funds for local jurisdictions such
that it expropriates funds from the local revenue sharing system, and if the supply of capital
is su±ciently inelastic, a marginal increase of the local tax rate above the ¯rst best, induced
by the local revenue sharing system, is bene¯cial for the state government.
13Proposition 1 says that a (partly) sel¯sh state government uses her local revenue sharing
system in order to induce higher local tax rates. This result can easily be applied to
understand why such revenue sharing systems may lead to excessive equalization in the
sense that a local jurisdiction has to pay more than 100% of additional tax revenue into the
revenue sharing system. To see this, consider the case where capital supply is completely
inelastic, @s
@r = 0, so that Proposition 1 applies. In this case, the ¯rst best contribution rate is
#¤ = ¿, as can be seen from (10). Hence, already in the ¯rst best, the grant system entirely
takes away any increase in local tax revenue induced by an increasing tax base. Adding now
a sel¯sh motive for the state government, there is an incentive to raise the contribution still
further. Thus, as the following Corollary implies, an increase in a jurisdiction's tax base
actually reduces her revenues after equalization.
Corollary 1 (Excessive Equalization)
If the state government values own funds more than the funds for local jurisdictions such that
it expropriates funds from the local revenue sharing system, and if the supply of capital is
completely inelastic, then increasing the contribution rate above the local tax rate is bene¯cial
for the state government.
Given that the state government extracts funds it is useful to consider as a simple compara-
tive static exercise a variation in exogenous resources received by the state. As a reduction
in m forces the state to cut spending, it contributes to an increase in the marginal bene¯t
of state spending. Hence, we should expect that the state induces jurisdictions to set higher
tax rates. To see that this is the case, let us reformulate optimality condition (13); given
























































! = 0: (14)
14Recall from above that, with a low elasticity of capital supply, the second term will be
positive. Then, it is obvious that with an increase in ¯ @w
@e the second term rises. In order
to restore optimality, the remaining parts of @L3
@#i have to decrease which, around a local
maximum, requires an increase in #i. That in turn implies that the state induces local
jurisdictions to raise their tax rate:
Proposition 2 (Impact of State Level Revenue)
Under the conditions of Proposition 1, if the state government experiences a reduction in
revenue m independent of local jurisdictions' policies, a marginal increase of the local tax
rate, induced by the local revenue sharing system, is bene¯cial for the state government.
2.4 Disincentive E®ect of Fiscal Equalization at State Level
Besides of own objectives of state governments the e±ciency orientation of states is par-
ticularly doubtful in the German situation, where the states are subject to a large degree
of ¯scal redistribution among states: They have to share a substantial amount of local tax
revenue, say »k, with the other states and the federal government. Thus, even if states
are simply benevolent, the transfer obligation will alter the marginal cost of providing local
public services and, hence, will a®ect e±cient revenue sharing.
In order to analyze this case, we have to modify the above budget constraint (6) by the
amount of transfers to other states »
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Di®erentiation with respect to yi again yields the f.o.c. (7), ¸4 = ®i
@v
@zi. Using this in the











































! = 0: (15)
The additional term captures the consequences of revenue sharing on tax policy: if a higher
tax rate at i reduces capital supply, also the transfers to the state level ¯scal equalization
system are reduced. Consequently, this last term is positive, indicating that the contribution
rate #i is increased against the case where » = 0. However, if capital supply is inelastic
(@s
@r = 0), the last term vanishes. In this case the spending obligation is ¯nanced solely by
a uniform reduction of grants without altering the contribution rates.
Of course, as above we could introduce the assumption that the state government extracts
resources from the jurisdictions by means of the local revenue sharing system as there is
a minimal mandatory endowment of jurisdictions with unconditional grants (11). In this
case, the additional transfer obligations at the level of states would reduce the amount of
state spending























































! = 0: (16)

















! = 0: (17)
While the ¯rst term is equivalent to the case of own state government objectives, the sec-
ond term captures the impact of the ¯scal equalization system between federal and state
16governments. Note that this term is positive: it re°ects the fact that a tax rate increase
lowers the tax base in the state and, therefore, reduces transfer obligations out of the state
budget. This exerts an incentive towards a higher contribution rate and higher taxes.
Together, the last two results can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 3 (Distortion by State Level Fiscal Equalization)
If the state government has to contribute to a redistributive system of intergovernmental
transfers some part of the revenue raised at the local level, »
P
j kj, and if the supply of
capital is not completely inelastic, then a marginal increase of the local tax rate, induced by
the local revenue sharing system, is bene¯cial for the state government, regardless of whether
it is benevolent or expropriating funds for wasteful purposes.
3 Empirical Analysis
The above propositions seem to be of particular relevance in the case of the German fed-
eration. While local municipalities make use of a local business tax and, consequently, are
involved with tax competition, each state redistributes revenue substantially by means of
a local ¯scal revenue sharing system. Previous research has shown that the redistribution
causes local municipalities to set rather high tax rates (Buettner, 2005). However, while the
systems of local revenue sharing are broadly similar across states, there are di®erences in
institutional details which make it very di±cult to come up with key parameters such as the
level of grants and the marginal contribution rates for all states. Therefore, the empirical
analysis is concerned with the implications of a state in°uence on local revenue sharing for
the local business tax rate.
3.1 State and Local Finances in Germany
In order to identify a state in°uence on local tax policy we need to ¯nd some variation in the
conditions faced speci¯cally by state governments but not by local jurisdictions. Moreover,
17it is important that this variation is not a®ected or, statistically, correlated with the local
jurisdictions taxing decisions. A ¯rst variable which comes to mind is the level of the debt
burden. As the level of debt is inherited from past policy it seems useful to consider a state's
debt burden as an indicator of the availability of ¯scal resources in the sense of Proposition
2. However, there are two obvious problems with this approach. The ¯rst relates to a
potential correlation between state and local ¯nances. If there is some common source of
shocks driving de¯cits both at state and local level, the empirical correlation with state level
debt might be misleading. In order to overcome this problem we will include debt-variables
for both state and local debt. This allows us to consider the impact of state debt conditional
on the local debt burden. A second problem arises from the role of the capital market in
the determination of the interest rate. If tax policies are taken into account by the capital
market it seems generally possible that certain tax policies are re°ected in the interest
rate or the market value of the debt. However, as the federal government is forced by the
constitution to provide a backing for state ¯nances this e®ect is likely to be negligible.4
Another promising source for variation in conditions faced by state governments is the
system of ¯scal equalization at the state level which exerts important incentives for state
government policies. Depending on the ¯scal capacity relative to what is considered as
\¯scal need" the system of ¯scal equalization allocates funds such that states with low
capacity receive transfers while those with high capacity will actually contribute to the
system. A change in the grants received implies a shift in the state-government budget
constraint which will according to Proposition 2 result in di®erent local tax rates provided
the state government pursues own policies and has already lowered unconditional grants
to municipalities. A second potentially important variable derived from the state-level
equalization system is the marginal contribution rate. This is the rate at which an increase
in the state-wide business tax base is actually reducing the net transfers received within
the state-level ¯scal revenue sharing system. As explained above (see Proposition 3), given
a higher marginal contribution rate the state might want to induce local jurisdictions to
increase taxing e®ort. A signi¯cant positive coe±cient of this variable will actually provide
4Seitz (1999) describes how supreme court decisions on the federal support have prevented the rating of
state bonds to deteriorate relative to the federal level.
18evidence on the pure (dis-)incentive e®ect of state level ¯scal equalization on the state's
operation of the local ¯nances. With this approach, the empirical analysis is related to
Baretti et al. (2002) who ¯nd some support for the hypothesis that intergovernmental
relations at the state level exert adverse disincentive e®ects on a state's revenue collection.
In contrast, our analysis is concerned with the incentive e®ects on local taxation which
originate in the state's role to enforce revenue sharing among local jurisdictions.
As is discussed in more detail in Buettner (2005) in the context of municipalities, the fact
that equalization grants and marginal contribution rate are determined by a complicated,
non-linear, albeit clearly de¯ned system of ¯scal equalization, allows us to pursue an identi-
¯cation strategy along the lines of regression discontinuity estimation (e.g., Van der Klauw,
2002, and Angrist and Lavy, 1999). Since, if we control for the potential in°uence of ¯scal
capacity in the estimation, we can separate out the di®erential treatment of the states.
3.2 Data
To study the German case, we have collected an annual database for German States in the
period between 1970 and 2003. Since data are only available from 1991 onwards, the new
states in former East Germany are excluded. Furthermore, we exclude the three so called
city states of Hamburg, Bremen, and Berlin since there is no clear distinction between state
and local level. The database contains information about the average tax rate for the local
business tax in each of the states and corresponding revenue data as well as net interest
expenses. In addition, the database contains detailed information about the treatment of
each state in the state-level equalization system. More speci¯cally, the database allows us
to compute for each state and each year all contributions and transfers related to ¯scal
equalization at the state level (see Appendix). Some further control variables are used to
capture the population size, the lagged tax base, and election years both at local and state
level. The latter will control for political business cycle e®ects which have been found to be
important at the local level (e.g., Bordignon, Cerniglia and Revelli, 2002).
Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics. The local tax rate is depicted by the collection
19Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Collection rate (in %) 352.3 37.57 254.0 431.6
State debt service (e per capita) 143.0 10.77 1.386 495.6
Municipal debt service (e per capita) 48.19 23.11 1.340 94.13
Population (in 1000) 7372 4992 1043 18073
State (net-)equalization revenue (e per capita) -17.24 107.2 -474.7 196.0
State marginal contribution rate (in %) 42.97 13.94 8.139 72.01
Rel. ¯scal capacity 1.861 .2785 .8901 2.460
Stand. business tax base (e per capita) 64.77 21.57 20.87 122.6
State parliament election year .2463 .4316 0 1
Municipal council election year .2022 .4001 0 1
Annual data for 8 German States in the period 1970-2003
rate (\Hebesatz"), which is an unknown concept for readers not acquainted with the German
case. However, it is rather simple: the tax law sets a base rate of 5% and requires each local
jurisdiction to set its collection rate. For instance, the collection rate might be a ¯gure of
380%, which means that the statutory tax rate applied to the ¯rm is 3:8 £ 0:05 = 19%.
The collection rate displays substantial variation across time and states. Note that level and
variation of debt service are much larger at the state as compared to the local level. State
net-equalization revenue varies strongly between positive and negative ¯gures indicating
that some states receive positive transfers while others are net contributors. Note that the
marginal contribution rate is above 40 % at the mean, indicating that on average a state
has to transfer an amount of more than 40 cents out of each Euro of additional tax revenue.
A problem with this variable is, however, that it shows not only a high degree of variation
across states but also strong °uctuations in time.
3.3 Results
Table 2 provides results from alternative speci¯cations. In order to control for the hetero-




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































21to adjust the lag of the tax rate is included. We also control for the tax base, but since the
current tax base is co-determined by the current tax rate, only the lag of the tax base is
employed. Speci¯cation (1) uses a basic set of explanatory variables, speci¯cation (2) addi-
tionally employs some cubic trend-polynomial in order to test for the importance of common
trends. Speci¯cation (3) to (5) test for an impact of the state-level ¯scal equalization system
including also terms capturing the di®erences in ¯scal capacity.
The strong e®ect of the lagged collection rate supports a standard partial adjustment pro-
cess. With regard to elections the political business cycle hypothesis is con¯rmed in the
sense that current municipal council elections do exert the expected negative e®ect. Elec-
tions for the state government are not found to exert an impact on taxation. With regard
to the debt service, we ¯nd not only that the municipal debt service exerts a signi¯cant
impact on the local tax rate but also that the burden of debt service at state-level proves
signi¯cant across all speci¯cations. In the light of Propositions 1 and 2 this supports the
view that the availability of ¯scal resources at the state level exerts an impact on the tax
policy of local jurisdictions. While we cannot say whether this e®ect is the consequence of
changes in the local revenue sharing system as the above theory suggests, this result raises
doubts whether the state government should really be considered as pursuing policies only
in the interest of municipalities.
With regard to incentives generated by the state-level ¯scal equalization system note that the
speci¯cations test for the e®ects conditional on (relative) ¯scal capacity. This is important
in order to make sure that the results capture the impact of ¯scal equalization rather than
simply re°ecting di®erences in the taxing capacity. In order to make sure that also no
non-linear di®erences in the ¯scal capacity are driving the result, speci¯cations (4) and (5)
employ quadratic and cubic speci¯cations, respectively. The results support an impact of
the volume of transfers received. Since net-revenue from equalization may be negative it is
entered in per-capita terms. In order to compare the magnitude of the estimate with that
of an increase in the state's debt burden we have to evaluate the semi-elasticity obtained
for the debt burden at the mean. Using the ¯gure of 143 e per capita as depicted in Table
1, we obtain an average marginal e®ect of the state debt service of about .028 which has a
22similar magnitude in absolute terms as the e®ect of the net-equalization revenue. Thus, the
point estimates imply that an increase in state revenue or a decline in the debt burden of
about 100 e per capita leads to a reduction in the collection rate by 2.5 or 2.8 percentage
points, i.e. 0.13 to 0.14 percentage points in the statutory tax rate in the short run, or
about 1.2 to 1.3 percentage points in the long run.5 The marginal contribution rate, which
determines to what extent net-transfers received shrink given an increase in business tax
revenue, shows no signi¯cant e®ect. This variable, however, shows rather strong °uctuations
since the system of ¯scal equalization not only responds in a non-linear fashion to the ¯scal
capacity of the considered state but also in a non-linear way on the ¯scal capacity of the
other states. This makes it very hard to identify incentive e®ect of ¯scal equalization at the
state level.
Taken together we can state that the empirical analysis provides partial con¯rmation of
the above theoretical predictions.6 The results obtained for the states' debt service and
the states' transfer revenues suggest that the position of the state government's budget
line has a signi¯cant e®ect on the level of taxation chosen by the local governments in a
state: a decline in available ¯scal resources at the state level causes an increase in local tax
rates. Broadly seen, this is in line with Proposition 2, which provides the argument that
the government assigns some value to its own funds such that it extracts ¯scal resources
from the local governments. By contrast, the third prediction, from Proposition 3, is not
con¯rmed. However, as we have just argued it seems likely that this failure is related to the
statistical properties of the state-level ¯scal equalization system.
5The latter calculation takes account of an estimate for the coe±cient of the lag of the collection rate of
about 0.89.
6Similar results have been obtained for Canadian provinces. Esteller-Mor¶ e and Sol¶ e-Oll¶ e (2002) ¯nd
that provinces which receive equalization grants set higher personal income tax rates if the contribution
rate to the equalization system is increased. Karkalakos and Kotsogiannis (2005) show that an increase in
the volume of federal grants received induces provinces to reduce their corporate income tax rates.
234 Conclusions
The recent literature has emphasized that redistributive grant systems may tend to in-
ternalize ¯scal externalities arising from tax competition (Bucovetsky and Smart, 2002,
KÄ othenbÄ urger, 2002), at least to some extent. While the existence of redistributive grant
systems might explain why local governments make use of distortive taxes despite of tax
competition (Smart, 1998, Buettner, 2005), it is di±cult to derive policy recommendations.
The reason is that the welfare implications from tax competition and tax coordination
strongly depend on the government objectives.
Given this background the current paper has explored the conditions under which redistribu-
tive grant systems will or will not achieve e±ciency in local ¯nances. We have considered
a standard model of tax competition of local jurisdictions and introduced a system of re-
distributive grants executed at the state level. The basic model has then been extended in
order to allow for variations in the government objectives at the state level. The theoretical
results suggest that similar to the literature on vertical tax competition (Keen and Kotso-
giannis, 2003, Wrede, 1998) attempts of upper level governments to extract ¯scal resources
from the local revenue sharing system will tend to undermine e±ciency of local ¯nances,
and, possibly, even result in excessive equalization.
These concerns are corroborated by the empirical analysis of tax policy in Germany. The
results from our empirical analysis of tax policy in Germany suggest that attempts of state
governments to extract ¯scal resources from the municipal revenue sharing system exert an
upward pressure on tax rates. While we cannot say whether this e®ect is the consequence
of changes in the local revenue sharing system as the above theory suggests, this result
raises doubts whether the state government should really be considered as pursuing policies
only in the interest of municipalities. The results of the paper support concerns that the
potential bene¯ts from local revenue sharing cannot be reaped if the state, as the institution
enforcing the revenue sharing system at the local level, pursues own policies and operates
under conditions which cause ine±ciencies at the state level.
24Appendix A: Proofs
Equivalence of (4) and (9). Since
@¿i
@#i 6= 0, the expression in brackets in (9) must be zero
in an optimum. Computing
@V 2
@¿i










































@zj = ¸2 for all i;j, condition (9) is so equivalent to














































A ! = 0
Close inspection of (A.1) reveals that the terms involving the contribution rates #i and #j




@zj for all i;j, we are back with the ¯rst
best optimality condition (4).
Calculation of the optimal contribution rate. Inserting the optimality condition from

































































Notice that in the symmetric situation,
@kj
@r is identical for all jurisdictions j, say @k
@r. Then,
dividing the numerator and the denominator of the fraction in the bracket by @r
@¿i 6= 0 and
multiplying both by r
nk yields #i = #¤ as in (10).
Appendix B: Data Sources and De¯nitions
The basic dataset consists of annual data for Germany in the period 1970 until 2003. The
population and GDP data are obtained from the federal statistical o±ce (Statistisches Bun-
desamt). The same applies to the average collection rates, the standardized business tax
revenues (Gewerbesteuergrundbetrag) as well as the data on debt service. Business tax
revenue sharing contributions (GewerbesteuerumlagesÄ atze) are obtained from the federal
ministry of ¯nance (Bundesministerium der Finanzen).
Average collection rates of the business tax (Gewerbesteuer) are averages of the munic-
ipalities' collection rates (HebesÄ atze) for the years (Rechnungsjahre) 1970-2003 weighted by
the tax base.
State net-equalization revenue and marginal contribution rates and relative ¯s-
cal capacity are obtained from a full implementation of the ¯scal equalization law and
further relevant statutory de¯nitions for each year in the period 1970-2003 (a description of
the system is given in Appendix C). Federal ¯scal equalization rules (Finanzausgleichsge-
setz - FAG) are obtained from the Bundesgesetzblatt. Data for calculating ¯scal capacity
(Finanzkraftmesszahl) and ¯scal need (Ausgleichsmesszahl) are taken from the annual enact-
ments to implement the ¯scal equalization law (Zweite Verordnung zur DurchfÄ uhrung des
Gesetzes Ä uber den Finanzausgleich zwischen Bund und LÄ andern in den Ausgleichsjahren
1970 - 2002). These enactments are also obtained from the Bundesgesetzblatt. Relative
¯scal capacity is de¯ned as the ratio of ¯scal capacity to ¯scal need.
26Debt service is de¯ned as annual interest expenses net of interest income.
Election years for state and local elections are obtained from the Friedrich-Naumann
Stiftung (Archiv des Liberalismus).
Appendix C: State-Level Fiscal Equalization in Germany
In order to capture the incentive e®ects of the state-level ¯scal equalization system (SFES)
in Germany, we employ a simulation program to calculate transfers received as well as
marginal contribution rates. The full implementation of the ¯scal equalization rules into
the simulation program enables us to compute various parameters of the SFES. The calcu-
lations are based on population and tax data for the German states (\BundeslÄ ander"). The
following brie°y describes the system in its current state (2004).
The treatment of a state within the system depends on the ratio of its ¯scal capacity
(\Finanzkraftmesszahl") and its ¯scal needs (\Ausgleichsmesszahl"). We will refer to this
ratio as the relative ¯scal capacity. A state's ¯scal capacity ti is determined by the sum of
its tax revenues from di®erent types of taxes.7 Fiscal needs ni are calculated by multiplying






where P represents the overall population while pi denotes the population in state i. States
with ¯scal capacity below ¯scal needs receive transfers, while states with a ¯scal capacity
exceeding ¯scal need contribute to the system.
The German SFES contains three di®erent stages:
² VAT Equalization (\Umsatzsteuervorwegausgleich")
7In the SFES the following main types of taxes are taken into account: income tax, corporate income
tax, VAT and excise and sales taxes, and a fraction of the municipal taxes.
27² State Fiscal Equalization (\Finanzausgleich i.e.S.")
² Federal Grants (\BundesergÄ anzungszuweisungen")
VAT Equalization In the ¯rst stage of the SFES up to 25% of the overall VAT revenues
are used to compensate ¯scal capacity di®erences between the German states. States with





where the transfer rate in stage one of the SFES, °1, represents a function of the state`s
relative ¯scal capacity.8 To see how a marginal increase in the tax revenues in state i a®ects




























The ¯rst term captures the e®ect of a decreasing transfer rate on zi1. As °0
1 < 0, since an
increase in ¯scal capacity lowers the transfer rate, this term is negative. Taking into account
that an increase in the ¯scal capacity of state i will also have a positive impact on its ¯scal
need, the second summand is positive. The overall e®ect for a low capacity state, i.e. a state
which is characterized by a relative ¯scal capacity below one, is negative indicating that an
increase in tax revenues will reduce the amount of transfers the state receives within the
SFES.
On the other hand, also high ¯scal capacity states will be a®ected by stage one. A marginal
increase in the tax revenues will not only raise ¯scal capacity in this state but will also raise
¯scal need in state i as well as in all other states. Low capacity states will then receive
additional transfers within VAT Equalization, which are ¯nanced out of the overall VAT
8Note that in the VAT Equalization stage only the state revenues are taken into account. In stage
two and three ¯scal capacity will also include a fraction of the municipal tax revenues as well as the VAT
revenues.




to the SFES. Here ci1 denotes the contribution rate for a high capacity state within VAT
Equalization.
Fiscal Equalization In the second stage of the SFES ¯scal capacity di®erences which






depending on their relative ¯scal capacity. The only di®erence is that now also VAT revenues
as well as revenues from municipal taxes are taken into account for calculating ti2 and ni2.
The e®ect of an increase in ¯scal capacity
@zi2
@ti2 is equivalent to stage one.
In the Fiscal Equalization stage high ¯scal capacity states, i.e. states which are characterized





The contribution rate ±2 represents a function of the relative ¯scal capacity in state i. Then
















Note that the ±0
2 > 0 indicating that an increase in ¯scal capacity will lead to a higher
contribution rate. Again we can distinguish two di®erent e®ects. The e®ect due to an
increased contribution rate as well as an e®ect which arises from the fact, that an increase
in the ¯scal capacity in state i will increase ¯scal need in all states. Both e®ects are positive
leading to an overall increase in state i`s contributions to the SFES.
29Federal grants If a state`s relative ¯scal capacity lies below 0.995 after the stages one
and two it will in addition receive transfers from the federal level, formally
zi3 = 0:775[0:995ni3 ¡ ti3] = 0:771ni3 ¡ 0:775ti3:






¡ 0:775 < 0:
As this partial derivative is negative an increase in the ¯scal capacity of a low capacity state
i will lead to a decrease in grants from the federal government.
Marginal Contribution Rates for the SFES The marginal contribution rates for the
di®erent stages of the SFES were calculated as follows.
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By adding the marginal contribution rates from the di®erent SFES stages one receives the
overall marginal e®ect of an increase in a state's tax revenues. For practical reasons the
simulations assume a tax increase by one percent. Then, for example, the mean marginal
contribution rate of 43% indicates that only 57 cent of the additional taxes remain in the
state budget due to increased contributions or reduced transfers within the SFES.
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